CORDIS · DE-CONSPIRATOR
Detecting and Countering Information Suppression from A Transnational Perspective
- Code
DE-CONSPIRATOR- Programme
- HORIZON
- Call
HORIZON-CL2-2023-DEMOCRACY-01-02- Status
- SIGNED
- Period
- 2024-01-01 – 2026-12-31
Official data · CORDIS · synced 2026-10-17 10:16 · official record
Participants
| Organisations | Role | Country | Grant |
|---|---|---|---|
| OZYEGIN UNIVERSITESI | coordinator | TR | 350 625 € |
| VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT BRUSSEL | participant | BE | 344 750 € |
| ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI | participant | IT | 333 125 € |
| WHITE RESEARCH SRL | participant | BE | 320 000 € |
| RUPRECHT-KARLS-UNIVERSITAET HEIDELBERG | participant | DE | 246 329 € |
| ADCOGITO ELGSENOS TYRIMU INSTITUTAS, VSI | participant | LT | 237 000 € |
| CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRACY | participant | BG | 234 875 € |
| CENTRE D'INFORMACIO I DOCUMENTACIO INTERNACIONALS A BARCELONA | participant | ES | 205 125 € |
| УНИВЕРСИТЕТ ГРЬОНИНГЕН | participant | NL | 201 824 € |
| RIGAS STRADINA UNIVERSITATE | participant | LV | 168 438 € |
| UNIVERSITEIT VAN AMSTERDAM | participant | NL | 140 676 € |
| EKONOMI VE DIS POLITIKA ARASTIRMALAR MERKEZI DERNEGI - EDAM | participant | TR | 127 000 € |
| THE UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA | participant | GE | 84 327 € |
| GEORGIA'S REFORMS ASSOCIATES | participant | GE | 5 673 € |
Description
The proposed project explores; a) how Russia and China pursue information-suppression tactics in the EU and its partner countries (PCs) and how they construct/strategize these tactics, b) which cases of FIMI have been the most impactful in EU countries and PCs, and how to measure the importance of future FIMI 'attacks' c) which transnational dissemination and consumption networks have been contributing to the success of foreign information-suppression attempts within the EU, d) the social and psychological drivers of which forms of FIMI succeed, e) how can the existing legal, regulatory, and diplomatic frameworks in the EU (such as the GDPR or Digital Services Act) and PCs be improved to build greater resilience against such efforts, and f) opportunities and pitfalls of platform-level governance that could be improved to improve collective EU and PC defences against FIMI, in an interdisciplinary, multi-method, interconnected and multinational manner. The value of this research linkage is; (1) better understanding FIMI from the perpetrator side for more accurate defense, (2) why trans-European information networks knowingly or unknowingly (misinformation vs disinformation) adopt semantic narratives of certain FIMI attempts and contribute to their domestic and Europe-wide dissemination, (3) synoptically evaluate and methodologically sharpen existing research on cognitive and societal drivers of which topic and content types remain most salient in ‘successful’ FIMI cases, (4) approach the research gaps that exist in this field by providing an interdisciplinary focus by combining political communication, international relations, social psychology, area studies (EU, China and Russia), security studies and computational social science, and (5) present an expanded solution space by creating an interconnected menu of legal, regulatory, diplomatic and technological policy and regulatory options to help counter FIMI in a more coordinated and targeted fashion.
Official data · CORDIS · synced 2026-10-17 10:16 · official record · Licence: © European Union, CC BY 4.0 (Commission reuse policy).